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ABSTRACT 
 
This article outlines the more recent reforms introduced by the legislature in the United 
Kingdom in passing the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 (UK) 
and the Insurance Act 2015 (UK). Further, it places in a comparative perspective the parallel 
developments in Australian insurance law. Australia has, over a more extended period since 
the passage of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Australia), effected major changes to the 
common law in an endeavour to modernise the law and practice of insurance.  
It is instructive to consider the relative approaches adopted in the United Kingdom and in 
Australia to ameliorate commonly perceived difficulties and problems and it is interesting to 
note that the thrust, if not the detail, of these reforms demonstrate a common purpose and 
a similarity in response in addressing the various issues and problems.  
The article discusses how overall these reforms achieve their objective to modernise the law 
and to alleviate or eliminate problems identified by the courts, policyholders, law reform 
bodies and the industry itself.  
Finally, it is suggested that further refinements to the insurance laws in both jurisdictions 
will enhance uniformity in an increasingly interconnected world (such as bringing the 
various Marine Insurance Acts into conformity with the amended Marine Insurance Act 
1906 (UK)), and strengthen causation and proportionality requirements in determining 
when breaches are operative, and the consequences attendant upon operative breaches. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The English and Scottish Law Commissions embarked upon a joint insurance law reform 
program in 2006 and the product of their work is the passage of two new Acts – the 
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 (UK) and the Insurance Act 
2015 (UK). These Acts were preceded by various Issues Papers, Consultation Papers and 
Reports1 and the proposed reforms have been the subject of extensive discussion in 
academic literature.2  
These Acts have also resulted in significant amendments to the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
(UK) with potentially very important flow on effects in those jurisdictions which replicated 
this marine legislation in their domestic legal systems. 
As Merkin and Gurses3 observe “insurance law reform has been on the agenda in the UK for 
over 50 years” but until the passage of these Acts, amelioration of consumer related issues 
in insurance transacting and endeavours to address imbalances in the rights and 
responsibilities as between insurers and insureds were limited. For example, parts of the 
insurance industry in the United Kingdom adopted voluntarily in 1977 and 1986 Statements 
of Practice dealing with fair claims handling practices, which principles acquired statutory 
force under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK). Accordingly, these Acts 
represent a major step forward in aligning the law and practice of insurance to modern 
circumstances and markets. 
This article outlines the more recent reforms introduced by the legislature in the United 
Kingdom and places in a comparative perspective the parallel developments in Australian 
insurance law. Australia has, over a more extended period since the passage of the 
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Australia), effected major changes to the common law in an 
endeavour to modernise the law and practice of insurance. It is instructive to consider the 
relative approaches adopted in the United Kingdom and in Australia to ameliorate 
commonly perceived difficulties and problems. 
This consideration gives rise to recommendations for further reform in the United Kingdom 
and in Australia having regard to the respective law reform agendas. 
2. CONSUMER INSURANCE (DISCLOSURE AND REPRESENTATIONS) ACT 2012 (UK) 
This Act, which came into force on 6 April 2013, significantly alters a consumer insured’s 
duties in relation to non-disclosure and misrepresentation in consumer insurance contracts. 
A consumer insurance contract is defined to mean a contract of insurance between (a) an 
individual who enters into the contract wholly or mainly for purposes unrelated to the 
individual’s trade, business or profession, and (b) a person who carries on the business of 
                                                            
1 See for example, Insurance Contract Law: Misrepresentation, Non-disclosure and Breach of Warranty by the 
Insured, Law Com. No. 182, Scottish Law Com. No. 134 (June 2007); Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission’s Law Com No. 319; Scot Law Com No. 219 joint report "Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-Contract 
Disclosure and Misrepresentation" (2009); Insurance Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure 
and the Law of Warranties, Law Com. No. 294, Scottish Law Com. No.155 (June 2012); Insurance Contract Law: 
Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment, Law Com. No. 
353, Scottish Law Com. No. 238 (July 2014). 
2 See, for example, M. Clarke, ‘Insurance Warranties: the absolute end’ [2007] LMCLQ 474; R.Merkin and 
J.Lowry, ‘Reconstructing Insurance Law: The Law Commission’s Consultation Paper’ (2008) 71 MLR 95; 
G.Blackwood, ‘The Pre-contractual Duty of (Utmost) Good Faith: The Past and The Future’ [2013] LCMLQ 311; 
R.Merkin and O. Gurses, ‘The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing The Interests of Insurer and Assured” [2015] 78 
MLR 1004. 
3 R.Merkin and O. Gurses, ‘The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing The Interests of Insurer and Assured” [2015] 
78 MLR 1004, at 1005. 
insurance and who becomes a party to that contract by way of that business…”4 The 
consumer insured is under a duty to take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation 
to the insurer.5 Whether the insured has complied with this duty is to be determined in light 
of all the relevant circumstances,6 and the Act provides examples of things which may need 
to be taken into account in making that determination:  namely “(a) the type of consumer 
insurance in question, and its target market, (b) any relevant explanatory material or 
publicity produced or authorised by the insurer, (c) how clear, and how specific, the 
insurer’s questions were, (d) in the case of a failure to respond to the insurer’s questions in 
connection with the renewal or variation of a consumer insurance contract, how clearly the 
insurer communicated the importance of answering those questions (or the possible 
consequences of failing to do so), and (e) whether or not an agent was acting for the 
consumer”.7 Subject to two qualifications, the standard of care required is that of a 
reasonable consumer.8 The qualifications are (a) if the insurer was, or ought to have been, 
aware of any particular characteristics or circumstances of the actual consumer, those must 
be taken into account9 and (b) a misrepresentation made dishonestly is always to be taken 
as showing lack of reasonable care.10 
The effect of these provisions is to place the onus squarely upon the insurer to ask questions 
in respect of any consumer insurance contract and it is obvious that the clearer and more 
directed the questions the greater the likelihood that an insurer could demonstrate failure 
by an insured under the new requirements.  
Under the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK) the sole remedy for non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation was avoidance of the contract ab initio,11 subject to repayment of the 
premium in the absence of fraud.12 The pre-contractual duties enshrined in this legislation 
and the remedy of avoidance have consistently been held by the courts to apply to all forms 
                                                            
4 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.1. Contracts of marine insurance which are 
also consumer insurance contracts (for example, in relation to a recreational ship or vessel) are subject to this 
legislation and the utmost good faith requirements at common law or pursuant to the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 are subject to the provisions of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2019 See s, 
s.2(5). The Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill (HL), para. [18], 
further clarifies that ‘ the consumer must be a natural person, rather than a legal person (such as a company or 
corporation). The definition expressly provides for mixed use contracts. Where a policy covers some non-
business and some business use, the main purpose of the insurance needs to be considered. For example, 
insurance would be considered to be "consumer insurance" if vehicle insurance covers a limited amount of 
business use, or if home contents insurance covers some business equipment’.  
5 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.2(2).  
6 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.3(1).  
7 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.3(2).  
8 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.3(3). The Explanatory Notes to the 
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill (HL), para. [28] elaborate upon this as follows: 
‘Under subsection (3) the test when looking at whether the consumer has taken reasonable care, is objective; 
that of the reasonable consumer. This test does not usually take into account any particular characteristics of 
the actual consumer, such as their age or knowledge of English. The notion of "reasonableness" is a commonly 
used concept in English law to provide an objective but flexible standard against which any individual's conduct 
can be measured. The reasonable consumer denotes an average consumer with no special skills or knowledge 
taking into account the examples in subsection (2)’.  
9 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.3(4).  
10 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.3 (5).  
11 Marine Insurance Act 1906, ss. 17-20. 
12 Marine Insurance Act 1906, ss. 84(1). 
of insurance, including consumer insurance, on the grounds that it codifies the common 
law.13  Accordingly under the Marine Insurance Act the insured was obliged to voluntarily 
disclose every matter that would be material to the insurer’s decision to insure.  Failure to 
do this permits the insurer to avoid the contract and refuse all claims under it, even where 
the insured person is not aware of what the insurer would consider material.  
The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 is, in comparison, a 
much more subtle instrument.14 First, for the insurer to have any remedy at all, it must 
demonstrate that there has been a “qualifying misrepresentation.”15 A misrepresentation 
may be so categorised provided (a) the consumer did not take reasonable care and (b) the 
insurer can demonstrate inducement; namely, that without the misrepresentation, the 
insurer would not have entered the contract at all, or would only have done so on different 
terms.16 Provided this threshold is achieved the insurer may avail itself of the remedies set 
out in Schedule 1 of the Act. In essence a distinction is drawn between deliberate or reckless 
breach of duty,17 which justifies avoidance and retention of the premium to the extent that 
such retention would not be unfair to the consumer, and careless breach of duty. As Merkin 
and Gurses18 explain, in this latter case ‘the insurer is to be put back in the position it can 
prove would have prevailed but for the breach of the duty; if the outcome would have been 
the same, there is no remedy; (b) if the risk would not have been written on any terms, the 
policy can be avoided; (c) if the risk would have been written with additional contractual 
safeguards, the insurer is entitled to have the policy rewritten to that effect; and (d) in 
addition to (c), if the insurer would have charged a higher premium, the assured can only 
recover that proportion of the loss represented by the proportion of the full premium 
actually paid’.19 
The Act addresses also some specific issues that arise in relation to consumer insurance 
contracts. Section 6 abolishes "basis of contract" clauses thereby precluding an insurer 
from reliance upon a declaration on an insurance proposal form or policy stating that the 
consumer warrants the accuracy of the answers or that the answers form the basis of the 
contract. This effectively would turn the consumer’s representation into a warranty. As 
the Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill 
(HL)20 explain, in the absence of this legislative intervention, the insurer would be 
                                                            
13 See, for example, Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501, at 521. 
14 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.11, removes any application of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906, ss 18-20, to consumer insurance contracts. 
15 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.4. 
16 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.4(1). This reflects the current law on 
inducement as developed following the House of Lords decision in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top 
Insurance Co Ltd. [1995] 1 AC 501. 
17  The Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill (HL), para. [36], 
explain that a ‘consumer acts deliberately if they act with knowledge. As established in the case of Derry v 
Peek (1889) LR 14 App Cas. 337 a consumer acts recklessly if they act without care and regard for the truth of 
an answer’.  
18 R.Merkin and O. Gurses, ‘The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing The Interests of Insurer and Assured” [2015] 
78 MLR 1004, at 1009..  
19 At pp.7,8. 
20 Para [41]. 
discharged from liability for all claims if a misrepresentation was made, even if the 
misrepresentation was immaterial and did not induce the insurer to enter the contract.21  
Provision is made for a situation where a member of a group insurance policy makes a 
misrepresentation. Where this happens the misrepresentation will only have 
consequences for the cover of that member and not for the policy as a whole.22 The 
situation where insurance is taken out by a consumer on another person’s life is also 
addressed. Currently, the person whose life is being insured does not normally owe a 
duty of care when providing information, because they are not a party to the contract. 
The Act changes this so that when answering questions posed by the insurance company, 
the person whose life is being insured has a duty to take reasonable care not to make a 
misrepresentation. If that individual makes a misrepresentation, the insurer will have the 
same remedies they would have had if the consumer taking out the policy made the 
misrepresentation.23  
The Act expressly preserves normal agency law, which states that a party is responsible 
for the actions of their own agent. A framework is established for deciding whether, for 
the purposes of the Act, the intermediary whether a broker, insurance consultant or 
other acts as an agent for the insurer or for the consumer.24 If the agent acts for the 
insurer, any wrongdoing by the agent is the responsibility of the insurer and the insurer 
will have to pay any claim accordingly. If the agent is acting for the consumer, the agent’s 
knowledge is considered to be that of the consumer. If an agent acts deliberately or 
recklessly an insurer may be entitled to avoid a policy even if the consumer themselves 
had acted honestly and reasonably. If the agent acts carelessly then the insurer has the 
same proportionate remedies that it would have had against a careless consumer.25 
Finally, the Act prevents insurers from contracting out of the provisions of the Bill to the 
detriment of the consumer. A term in a consumer insurance contract or a term in 
another contract is void to the extent that it would put the consumer in a worse position 
than provided for in the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act.26  
3. INSURANCE ACT 2015 (UK) 
This Act, which is due to commence operation on 12 August 2016, addresses four crucial 
areas of insurance law: Good faith and contracting out; the duty of fair presentation; 
warranties and other terms; and fraudulent claims.  
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides in section 17 that insurance contracts are 
contracts based upon utmost good faith and that ‘if utmost good faith be not observed 
                                                            
21The Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill (HL), para. [42], note 
that it remains possible for insurers to include specific warranties in the contract of insurance. To be valid, such 
a warranty would need to be fair within the meaning of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999.  
22 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.7. 
23 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.8. Explanatory Notes to the Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill (HL), para. [50]- [52]. 
24 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s.9. 
25 Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill (HL), para. [53]- [57]. 
 
26 Section 10. 
by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other party”. The Insurance Act 2015 
removes the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty of good faith in 
section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, and any equivalent common law rule.27 
Section 17 is amended to simply state that a contract of marine insurance is one of 
utmost good faith.  The Explanatory Notes to the legislation describe the intention of this 
amendment as follows: 
‘[G]ood faith will remain an interpretative principle, with section 17 of the 1906 Act and 
the common law continuing to provide that insurance contracts are contracts of good 
faith’.28  
Merkin and Gurses29 suggest that three possibilities flow from this; namely:  
First, section 17 may itself be elevated into the status of an Australian-style implied term, 
with damages for its breach…. Secondly, section 17 may be used as the basis for implying 
specific terms into a contract of insurance, a step which the courts had begun to take 
even before the passing of the Insurance Act 2015. Thirdly, the courts might adopt 
entirely fresh remedies, for example, estoppel which precludes a party – typically the 
insurer- from relying upon a policy term or other right that might otherwise be open to 
that party”. 
The Insurance Act 2015 effects further change to the Marine Insurance Act 1906 by 
repealing sections 18-20. These sections set out the pre-contractual duties of the insured 
and any agent to disclose material facts, being defined as facts that would influence the 
judgment of a prudent underwriter, the duty upon an agent to disclose material facts 
known to the agent whether or not the insured was aware of them, and the insured’s 
duty not to misrepresent material facts. 
Instead the Insurance Act 2015 introduces a “duty of fair presentation”, applicable to 
non-consumer insurance contracts only, requiring an insured to disclose risk information 
to insurers before entering into an insurance contract.30 The obligation is to make a fair 
presentation of the risk which is defined as one which (a) discloses every material 
circumstance which the insured knows or ought to know, or failing that, discloses to the 
insurer sufficient information to put a prudent insurer on notice that it needs to make 
further enquiries for the purpose of revealing those material circumstances; (b) makes 
the disclosure in a manner which would be reasonably clear and accessible to a prudent 
insurer; (c) in which every material representation as to a matter of fact is substantially 
correct.31 In the absence of enquiry the insured is not required to disclose a circumstance 
if it diminishes the risk, the insurer knows it, the insurer ought to know it, the insurer is 
presumed to know it or it is something as to which the insurer waives information.32 The 
test of materiality is the objective test as to whether the circumstance or representation 
                                                            
27 Section 14. 
28 Explanatory Notes to the Insurance Act 2015, para.[116]. 
29 R.Merkin and O. Gurses, ‘The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured” [2015] 
78 MLR 1004, at 1007.  
30 Section 2. 
31 Section 3. Note that a material representation is substantially correct if a prudent insurer would not consider 
the difference between what is represented and what is actually correct to be material.(s.7(5)) 
32 Sections 3(6); 5. 
would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in determining whether to take the 
risk and, if so, on what terms.33 The Act provides examples of what may be material 
circumstances; namely, special or unusual facts relating to the risk; any particular 
concerns which led the insured to seek insurance cover for the risk; and, anything those 
concerned with the class of insurance and field of activity in question would generally 
understand as being something that should be dealt with in a fair presentation of risks of 
the type in question.34 The requirement that disclosure be in a manner that is reasonably 
clear and accessible to a prudent insurer addresses a long standing problem of data 
dumping whereby a broker or insured provides ‘a mass of information, often in CD form, 
which contains deeply buried material information’.35 
The Act seeks to define the boundaries of what constitutes “knowledge” for purposes of 
disclosure of every material circumstance which the insured knows or ought to know. 
Where the insured is an individual, such as a sole trader or practitioner, that person as 
well as their own knowledge, will be taken to ‘know’ anything which is known by an 
individual who is responsible for the insured’s insurance.36 Where the insured is not an 
individual, such as a company, certain individuals’ knowledge is directly attributed to the 
insured; in essence, the insured’s senior management or people responsible for the 
insured’s insurance.37 The insured, whether an individual or not, ought to know what 
should reasonably have been revealed by a reasonable search of information available to 
the insured- whether the search is conducted by making enquiries or by any other 
means.38 Finally, ‘blind eye knowledge’ is addressed as for the purposes of these 
provisions references to an individual’s knowledge includes not only actual knowledge, 
but also matters which the individual suspected, and of which the individual would have 
had knowledge but for deliberately refraining from confirming them or enquiring about 
them.39 
The Act introduces a new system of proportionate remedies where the duty has been 
breached. The approach adopted is similar to that adopted under the Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 with one significant difference. 
Under the Insurance Act 2015, if the breach is a qualifying breach and the inducement 
test is satisfied, the insurer may avoid the contract where it can prove the breach was 
deliberate or reckless, or where it can prove that the qualifying breach was such that it 
would not have entered the contract on any terms;40 namely, there is a remedy of 
avoidance even in the absence of fraud or recklessness which is not available in relation 
                                                            
33 Section 7(3). 
34 Section 7(4). 
35 R.Merkin and O. Gurses, ‘The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured” [2016] 
79 MLR (forthcoming).  
36 Section 4(2). 
37 Section 4(3). Senior management means those individuals who play significant roles in the making of 
decisions about how the insured’s activities are to be managed or organised (s.8 (c)) and persons caught under 
the umbrella of individuals responsible for the insured’s insurance include the insured’s employee or agent, 
the insured’s broker etc (s. 8(a)). 
38 .Section 4(6). Information in this context includes information held within the insured’s organisation and by 
any other person(such as the insured’s agent or a person for whom cover is provided by the contract of 
insurance. (s. 4(7)). ‘Carve outs’ are provided in relation to certain confidential information (s. 4(4)). 
39 Sections 4(6); 6(1). 
40 Section 8; Schedule1. 
to consumer insurance contracts. 
The Insurance Act 2015 deals with pre-contractual representations in the same way as 
the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 (UK), and abolishes 
“basis of the contract” clauses, which have the effect of converting pre-contractual 
information supplied to insurers into warranties.41 Section 10 of the Act also abolishes 
any rule of law whereby a breach of a warranty (express or implied) in an insurance 
contract discharges the insurer from liability completely from that point onwards, even if 
the breach is remedied.42  Instead a breach of warranty now suspends rather than 
entirely discharges the insurer’s liability until the breach is remedied. The insurer will be 
able to rely upon the warranty to avoid liability for any claim arising during this period of 
suspension, but once the breach is remedied the policy resumes in full force.43 The Act 
also prevents an insurer from denying liability on the basis of breach of warranty where 
(a) because of a change of circumstances, the warranty ceases to be applicable to the 
circumstances of the contract, or (b) compliance with the warranty is rendered unlawful 
by any subsequent law, or (c) the insurer waives the breach of warranty.44 Merkin and 
Gurses45 describe the ‘suspensory solution as a ‘neat one’, but section 10 of the Act does 
not impose a causation test, requiring the breach to be causative of the loss.  
This is the preserve of section 11 of the Act, which provides that if a loss occurs, and an 
express or implied term of the contract of insurance has not been complied with, the 
insurer may not rely on the non-compliance to exclude, limit or discharge its liability 
under the contract for the loss if the insured shows that the non-compliance with the 
term could not have increased the risk of the loss which actually occurred in the 
circumstances.46 This section does not apply to a term defining the risk as a whole, but 
does apply to any term compliance with which would tend to reduce the risk of loss of a 
particular kind, or loss at a particular location, or loss at a particular time.47 
The Act provides the insurer with clear statutory remedies when a policyholder submits a 
fraudulent claim. The main remedy in the Act is the one already established by the 
courts: if a claim is tainted by fraud, the policyholder forfeits the whole claim.48 The Act 
also addresses a current area of uncertainty: the insurer may refuse any claim arising 
after the fraudulent act. However, previous valid claims are unaffected.49 The Act makes 
                                                            
41 Section 9. 
42 Section 10(1). 
43 Section 10(2).  
44 Section 10(3). Section 10(7) repeals the second sentence of section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
which provided that a promissory warranty is “ a condition which must be exactly complied with, whether it be 
material to the risk or not. If it be not so complied with, then, subject to any express provision in the policy, the 
insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of the breach of warranty, but without prejudice to any 
liability incurred by him before that date”. The italicized sentence is omitted to accommodate the suspensory 
reform introduced by section 10 of the Insurance Act 2015.Further section 10(7) repeals section 34 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 and substitutes section 10(3) as to when a breach of warranty does not apply.  
45 R.Merkin and O. Gurses, ‘The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured” [2015] 
78 MLR 1004, at 1019.  
46 Section 11(2),11 (3). 
47 Section 11(1). 
48 Section 12. 
49 Section 12(2), 12(3). 
special provision for situations in which a member of a group insurance policy makes a 
fraudulent claim. Where this happens, the insurer will have a remedy against the 
fraudulent member but it will not affect the other members or the insurance policy as a 
whole.50 
The Act provides that, as far as it applies to consumer insurance contracts, an insurer will 
not be able to use a contractual term to put a consumer in a worse position than they 
would under the provisions of the Act,51 nor is contracting out permitted in relation to 
present warranties in non-consumer business policies.52  However the remainder of the 
Insurance Act’s provisions are intended to provide default rules and parties are free to 
agree alternative regimes, provided that the insurer satisfies two transparency 
requirements.53 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The legislatures in the United Kingdom and in Australia have reached very similar landings in 
relation to key areas of insurance law reform. There are distinctions, sometimes important, 
in the detail but the thrust of the reforms exhibit a common purpose to address issues and 
problems that have been evident in the evolution of insurance law.  
For example, in relation to the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 
2012 (UK) the Explanatory notes to this legislation state: 
“… [The Act] abolishes the duty of disclosure in consumer insurance contracts and replaces 
it with the duty ‘to take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation’. This removes the 
consumer’s duty to volunteer information to the insurer. Instead, consumers are required to 
answer insurer’s questions honestly and to take reasonable care that their replies are 
accurate and complete.”54 
Similarly, in Australia so-called ‘eligible contracts’ of insurance receive special attention in 
the Insurance Contracts Amendment Act 2013 (Cth). These contracts are those prescribed 
under the Insurance Contracts Regulations 1985 (Cth) being contracts commonly transacted 
with consumers defined as motor vehicle insurance, home buildings and home contents, 
sickness and accident insurance, consumer credit insurance and travel insurance. For an 
insurer to be able to rely upon non-compliance by an insured with his/her duty of 
disclosure, section 21A requires the insurer to ask the insured specific questions that are 
relevant to the insurer’s decision whether to accept the risk and, if so, on what terms55. 
Moreover, this amending legislation precludes an insurer from asking the insured a “catch 
all” question which required the insured to disclose exceptional circumstances. This in the 
view of the legislature: 
                                                            
50 Section 13. 
51 Section 15. 
52 Section 16(1) 
53 Section 16(2). The transparency safeguards require that before a disadvantageous term may be enforced it 
must be clear and unambiguous as to its effect and the insurer must take reasonable steps to draw the term to 
the insured’s attention before contracting (s.17). 
54 Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill (HL), para. [21]. 
55 See also s.21 (B) in relation to the renewal of eligible contracts of insurance (regardless of when the contract 
was originally entered into). 
“tends to undermine the benefits for insureds of the framework for eligible contracts of 
insurance. Insurers should be in a position to decide what matters are material to their 
decision to provide eligible contracts of insurance and formulate their questions 
accordingly. In the event that an insurer is unable to foresee a matter that is relevant to 
their decision whether to accept the risk of a particular contract, then it is difficult to justify 
expecting an unsophisticated insured to realize its relevance”.56 
While there is a difference in the scope of the legislative requirements in that Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 (UK) is more broadly applicable to 
consumer insurance contracts generally, there is a clear common agenda to place the onus 
squarely upon the insurer to ask questions in respect of consumer insurance contracts. In 
this context the clearer and more directed the questions the greater the likelihood that an 
insurer could demonstrate failure by an insured under the new requirements.  
A further example arises in relation to remedies available to the insurer for non-disclosure 
or misrepresentation under the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Australia) or failure to take 
reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation under the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure 
and Representations) Act 2012 (UK) provide for a proportionate outcome. In relation to 
general insurance in Australia,57 the statutory remedies for non-disclosure and 
misrepresentation are not available to the insurer if “the insurer would have entered into 
the contract, for the same premium and on the same terms and conditions, even if the 
insured had not failed to comply with the duty of disclosure or had not made the 
misrepresentation”.58 Accordingly there must be reliance by the particular insurer in 
relation to both misrepresentation and non-disclosure for remedies under the Act to be 
available. The insurer may avoid a contract of general insurance from the beginning if the 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation is fraudulent,59 but avoidance is not available for 
innocent non-disclosure or misrepresentation; instead the liability of the insurer in respect 
of a claim is reduced to the amount that would place the insurer in the position it would 
have been had the non-disclosure or misrepresentation not occurred.60 For example, if the 
insurer would have issued the policy nevertheless but would have charged a higher 
premium, then the insurer would be entitled to reduce the claim by the amount of the 
additional premium. If the insurer would not have entered the contract at all, then it would 
be entitled to reduce its liability to zero. Similarly, under the Consumer Insurance 
                                                            
56 Explanatory Memorandum, Insurance Contracts Amendment Bill 2013, p.24. 
57 The statutory remedies in relation to life insurance are largely the same – especially after the passage of the 
Insurance Contracts Amendment Act 2013 (Cth). Again where a failure to disclose or misrepresentation is 
fraudulent, the insurer has an option to avoid the contract (s.29(1)) , except in limited circumstances. 
Misstatements of age, even if fraudulent, do not result in the avoidance of a contract of life insurance – 
instead the sum insured or premium payable is adjusted in accordance with a formula provided in the Act and 
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Contracts Amendment Act 2013 (Cth) whereby the insurer is given the option to change the expiration date to 
a date calculated on the basis of the correct date of birth, requiring neither the amount insured nor the 
premium to be modified(s.30(3A)). See also Insurance Contracts Amendment Regulation 2015 (No 1).  
58 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), s.28(1).  
59 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), s.28(2).   Note also that under the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) the 
court may disregard avoidance where, notwithstanding fraudulent non-disclosure or fraudulent 
misrepresentation, it would be harsh and unfair not to do so. 
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(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012(UK), the insurer is to be put back in the position 
it can prove would have prevailed but for the breach of the insured’s duty; if the outcome 
would have been the same, there is no remedy; (b) if the risk would not have been written 
on any terms, the policy can be avoided; (c) if the risk would have been written with 
additional contractual safeguards, the insurer is entitled to have the policy rewritten to that 
effect; and (d) in addition to (c), if the insurer would have charged a higher premium, the 
assured can only recover that proportion of the loss represented by the proportion of the 
full premium actually paid’.61 Clearly problems of proof arise in these circumstances as to 
what a particular insurer would, or would not do. Therefore, an insurer, if it wishes to 
preserve its capacity to avoid liability on the basis that it would not have entered into the 
contract at all had the true situation been known, would be well served by maintaining 
detailed underwriting guidelines supported by consistent adherence to those guidelines.62 
Consider also the treatment of warranties. Section 11 of the Insurance Act 2015 dictates 
that if a loss occurs and a contractual term to which section applies has not been complied 
with, the insurer is precluded from relying upon that non-compliance to avoid or limit its 
liability for the loss, if the insured shows that the non-compliance could not have increased 
the risk of the loss which actually occurred in the circumstances in which it actually 
occurred. The Explanatory Notes to the Act63 give the example of a property damaged by 
flooding where an insured could successfully invoke the protection of this section where the 
contractual breach was a failure to use a required type of lock on a window that could not 
have increased the risk of that loss. In this case the insurer would be obliged to pay out the 
flood claim.  
This section closely resembles section 54(1) of the Insurance Contracts Act (Australia). This 
section was enacted on the strong recommendation of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission64 who sought to introduce the dual brakes of causation and proportionality to a 
wide range of conduct or omissions that could impact upon insurance claims. The wording 
of the section requires that a distinction is drawn between acts which did or were 
reasonably capable of causing or contributing to the loss, and those which did not or could 
not contribute to the loss claimed by the insured. The scope of Australian legislation is more 
broadly cast than the Insurance Act provision but a common intent is clearly evident. 
Pursuant to section 54 where the conduct of the insured or some other person could not 
have caused or contributed to the loss, the particular claim is allowed save that the insurer’s 
liability “in respect of the claim is reduced by the amount that fairly represents the extent to 
which the insurer’s interests were prejudiced as a result of that act”.65 Thus, the insurer is 
required to provide an indemnity assessed by reference to ordinary contractual principles 
offset by the deduction of an amount that reflects the insurer’s loss calculated in 
                                                            
61 R.Merkin and O. Gurses, ‘The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured” [2015] 
78 MLR 1004, at 1009..  
62 See for example Michail v Australian Alliance Insurance Company Ltd [2014] QCA 138, Julie-Anne Tarr, 
“Insurance Contract Disclosure – An Uncertain Balance” (2015) 26 Insurance Law Journal 109. 
63 Explanatory Notes to the Insurance Act 2015, para. [95]. 
64  See Australian Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts, Report No 20 (AGPS, 1982) at [228]. See also 
Ball M, “Reducing Claims under the Insurance Contracts Act 1984” (1992) 5 Insolv LJ 1 at 4-25; Julie-Anne Tarr, 
“Controlling Insurance Contract Terms: Section 54 of the Insurance Contracts Act “(2014) 42 Australian 
Business Law Review 317. 
65 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), s 54(1). 
accordance with the principle of proportionality.66 Conversely where an act or omission of 
an insured or of some other person is within the scope of a contractual term and is 
potentially causative of any loss in respect of which insurance cover is provided by the 
contract, prima facie the insurer may refuse to pay the claim. Notwithstanding that the act 
or omission is potentially causative, if the insured proves that no part of the loss was caused 
by the insured’s act or omission, then the insurer cannot refuse to pay the claim.67 For 
example, if an intoxicated person has a personal injury policy excluding liability if the 
insured suffers injury “whilst intoxicated” and injury occurs when, through no fault on his or 
her own part, he or she is injured in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a vehicle 
driven by another, this is quite distinct from a situation where the insured drives 
dangerously while intoxicated and injures himself or herself, in which case the intoxication 
clearly is causative of the injury.68 Similarly if the insured proves that there was no causation 
as to some part of the loss, the insurer may not refuse to pay that part of the claim.69  
The insurance law reform agenda in the United Kingdom would, it is respectfully suggested, 
benefit from a further review of the scope of section 11 of the Insurance Act 2015 (UK). This 
provision would be more effective if its scope were broadened, as in section 54(1) of the 
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Australia), to encompass within its operation acts and/or 
omissions in relation to non-risk provisions.70  
In determining the scope and operation of these legislative provisions addressing terms not 
relevant to the actual loss, the courts in the United Kingdom and Australia should, with 
respect, heed the cautionary words of the High Court of Australia in FAI General Insurance 
Co Ltd v Australian Hospital Care Pty Ltd71. A balance that must be achieved between 
controlling and defeating technicalities in the construction and drafting of contracts that 
result in an insured losing the benefit of his or her policy after having engaged in conduct or 
committing a breach that was irrelevant or of peripheral impact to the risk insured, on the 
one hand, and ensuring on the other that the legitimate interests of the insurer are 
respected; namely, that the application of these remedial provisions do not inadvertently 
become a mechanism whereby the scope of cover itself is extended to embrace risks to 
which the policy was never intended to respond.  
The insurance law reform initiatives in the United Kingdom have made significant changes 
to the Marine Insurance Act 1906. In particular: the truncation of section 17 to the 
statement that a contract of marine insurance is one of the utmost good faith; the repeal of 
sections 18 (disclosure by assured), 19 (disclosure by agent effecting insurance), 20 
(representations pending negotiation of contract) and 34 (when breach of warranty is 
excused); the amendment of section 33 (nature of warranty) by the omission of the second 
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sentence in section 33(3).72 The Marine Insurance Act 1906 is faithfully reproduced in a 
number of jurisdictions73 including the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Australia). Given that the 
changes wrought to the Marine Insurance Act 1906 are of considerable practical importance 
and impact, it is recommended that the Australian legislature consider parallel amendments 
to the local version of this Act. Ensuring legal uniformity across this area of contracting 
would be commercially desirable. If this course was adopted there would be some 
amendment to the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Australia) required. The Insurance 
Contracts Act 1984 does not apply across the board to or in relation to contracts and 
proposed contracts covered by the Marine Insurance Act 1909, so a reform of the Marine 
Insurance Act to align it with the United Kingdom Act, would require the adoption of 
disclosure and warranty provisions to ‘plug’ the holes. At present the insurance of pleasure 
craft in Australia is excluded from the Marine Insurance Act 1909,74 and a solution to 
accommodate non-recreational or commercial vessels would be to adopt the reforms 
ushered in by the Insurance Act 2015.75 
In conclusion the insurance law reforms introduced in the United Kingdom and in Australia 
effect significant changes to the law and practice of insurance in both jurisdictions. The 
thrust, if not the detail, of these reforms demonstrate a common purpose and a similarity in 
response in addressing the various issues and problems. Overall these reforms achieve their 
objective to modernise the law and to alleviate or eliminate problems identified by the 
courts, policyholders, law reform bodies and the industry itself. Further refinements to the 
insurance laws in both jurisdictions will enhance uniformity in an increasingly 
interconnected world (such as bringing the various Marine Insurance Acts into conformity 
with the amended Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK)), and strengthen causation and 
proportionality requirements in determining when breaches are operative, and the 
consequences attendant upon operative breaches. 
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